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-The complexity of the grant program itself makes prompt implementation difficult.
-The federal government failed to
promptly provide services or essential
information, such as the promulgation
of regulations for claiming costs and
the processing of aliens' applications
for temporary residency status.
-State decisions regarding budgeting and approving costs to be charged
to the program have contributed to
delays.
-Some counties lack information
about requirements for claiming costs
and fail to act on available information.
-Finally, for most programs, aliens
have little or no incentive to identify
themselves as eligible to have the costs
of services reimbursed under the SLIAG
program, since no additional benefits
accrue to them for doing so.
Report No. F-426.1 (October 1991)
concerns the actions of the Department
of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC)
in billing responsible parties and recovering approximately $222 million
in costs incurred by DTSC from fiscal
year 1981-82 through 1989-90 in
monitoring and cleaning up hazardous
waste sites. Although state law requires
DTSC to recover such costs from those
responsible for the hazardous waste, the
Department has billed responsible parties for only $45 million and has collected just $ I 6 million. According to
OAG, the statute of limitations may
prevent DTSC from recovering $31
million of the costs incurred for fiscal
years I 981-82 through 1984-85. However, DTSC estimates that approximately $85 million of the $135 million
in costs incurred from fiscal years
1985-86 through 1988-89 may be collected; the Department has not yet determined the collectibility of the $56
million of costs incurred in fiscal year
1989-90.
OAG found that some costs cannot
be recovered because DTSC cannot
identify the responsible parties. In addition, some responsible parties that are
identified are either bankrupt or financially unable to repay all of the costs.
To improve DTSC's ability to recover the public funds spent cleaning
and monitoring toxic waste sites, OAG
recommends that the Department ensure that all costs that can be billed to
responsible parties are billed promptly,
and account for all clean-up costs, including costs that DTSC has determined
it cannot bill to responsible parties or
cannot collect.
Report No. P-054 (November 1991)
is a review of the California State
University's (CSU) disabled student

services. The CSU Chancellor's Office
allocated $7.9 million in fiscal year
I 990--91 to the twenty CSU campuses
to provide services for disabled students. OAG found that the twenty campuses spent $600,000 less than they
were allocated for disabled students,
including $400,000 in funds budgeted
for employee benefits. Also, two campuses paid approximately $75,000 to
employees on the disabled student services payroll who did not work with
disabled students, but in career counseling and international student programs. CSU's Northridge campus provided benefits to students without
verification of their disabilities because
the school lacks a system to identify
those students receiving services who
have not provided documentation of
their disabilities.
OAG concluded that the Chancellor's
Office should establish a system to monitor the campuses' disabled students services program to ensure that all funds
allocated for disabled student services
are budgeted by the campuses to provide those services, campuses spend disabled student services funds only on
services for disabled students, and campuses promptly verify each student's
disability.
Report No. F-864 (December 1991)
reviews the usefulness of Domestic Disclosure Spreadsheets to the Franchise
Tax Board (FTB). The spreadsheets disclose financial information on the operations of multinational banks and corporations and their affiliates in each
state; FTB anticipated using this information to ensure compliance with California tax laws. OAG found that FTB
has only recently trained its auditors to
use the spreadsheets and that they have
reviewed only a small percentage of the
spreadsheets filed by these corporations.
As a result, OAG made no definitive
conclusion about the usefulness of the
spreadsheets to FTB's audits. Preliminary responses from FTB auditors
ranged from positive comments regarding the usefulness of the spreadsheets to
comments that the spreadsheets are unnecessary. OAG noted that FTB has
assessed penalties of approximately $1.8
million against corporations that failed
to file, filed late, or filed incomplete
spreadsheets.
LEGISLATION:
SB 1132 (Maddy), as introduced
March 8, would require the Auditor
General to complete audits in accordance with the "Government Auditing
Standards" issued by the Comptroller
of the United States. This bill is pending
in the Senate Rules Committee.
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LITIGATION:
On October 10, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 140, the term limits
initiative approved by voters in November 1990. In Legislature v. Eu, No.
SO 19660, the court rejected arguments
that the initiative improperly infringes
on the voters' right to their choice of
candidates or the candidates' right to
run for public office. Although the court
struck down a provision of Proposition
140 that abolished the legislature's pension system, it upheld the initiative's
mandated 38% cut in the legislature's
operating budget. Legislative leaders,
including Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown, had threatened to eliminate
OAG and the Office of the Legislative
Analyst if the budget cuts were upheld.
Following the court's decision, however, Speaker Brown stated that the legislature will probably find a way to make
the cuts without eliminating those offices. For example, the legislature may
authorize OAG to bill state agencies for
the costs of federally-required audits.
Legislation on this issue is expected
during 1992. (See CRLR Vol. 11, No. 4
(Fall 1991) p. 49 and Vol. 11, No. 3
(Summer 1991) pp. 49-50 for background information.)
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(916) 445-2125

The Little Hoover Commission was
created by the legislature in 1961 and
became operational in the spring of
1962. (Government Code sections 8501
et seq.) Although considered to be within
the executive branch of state government for budgetary purposes, the law
states that "the Commission shall not be
subject to the control or direction of any
officer or employee of the executive
branch except in connection with the
appropriation of funds approved by the
Legislature." (Government Code section 8502.)
Statute provides that no more than
seven of the thirteen members of the
Commission may be from the same political party. The Governor appoints five
citizen members, and the legislature appoints four citizen members. The balance of the membership is comprised of
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two Senators and two Assemblymembers.
This unique formulation enables the
Commission to be California's only truly
independent watchdog agency. However, in spite of its statutory independence, the Commission remains a purely
advisory entity only empowered to make
recommendations.
The purpose and duties of the Commission are set forth in Government
Code section 8521. The Code states:
"It is the purpose of the Legislature in
creating the Commission, to secure assistance for the Governor and itself in
promoting economy, efficiency and improved service in the transaction of the
public business in the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities
of the executive branch of the state
government, and in making the operation of all state departments, agencies,
and instrumentalities and all expenditures of public funds, more directly responsive to !he wishes of the people
as expressed by their elected representatives .... "
The Commission seeks to achieve
these ends by conducting studies and
making recommendations as to the adoption of methods and procedures to reduce government expenditures, the
elimination of functional and service
duplication, the abolition of unnecessary services, programs and functions,
the definition or redefinition of public
officials' duties and responsibilities, and
the reorganization and or restructuring
of state entities and programs. The Commission holds hearings about once a
month on topics that come to its attention from citizens, legislators, and other
sources.

MAJOR PROJECTS:
Coordinating the Spending on Drug
Prevention Programs (October 1991).
In 1988, the Little Hoover Commission
conducted a study on the coordination
of a multitude of drug abuse prevention, intervention, treatment, and recovery programs existing at all levels of
government, with a focus on coordination of their funding. (See CRLR Vol. 8,
No. 4 (Fall 1988) pp. 34-35 for background information.) Following up on
its I 988 study, the Commission held a
public hearing in April 199 I and conducted interviews with state and local
officials. On October 30, the Commission released its letter report summarizing its current findings.
In its report, the Commission concluded that California now has a viable
master plan for addressing drug abuse,
and has adequately coordinated its ef-
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forts in the fight to prevent drug abuse.
According to the Commission, a great
deal of coordination is effectuated
through the development of the California Master Plan to Reduce Drug and
Alcohol Abuse (Plan) by the Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs.
The Plan provides the framework by
which state and local agencies and community-based organizations may coordinate their efforts and streamline the
deli very of services. However, the Commission concluded that total coordination will not be effective unless the programs being coordinated are successful
and the resources are directed appropriately. Thus, the Commission found that
the state must evaluate the success of
- -the various programs and approaches,
and determine how the effective ones
may be replicated.
Second, the report noted that funding for drug abuse prevention should be
further coordinated. Although the state
has made efforts to coordinate and simplify some of the funding provided to
the local level, further barriers to coordination exist on at least two levels: (I)
special-interest legislation that sets up
demonstration projects not covered in
the Plan; and (2) federal funding that
earmarks how money must be spent regardless of what is called for in the
state's Plan.
Specifically, the Commission found
that special-interest pilot projects which
are not part of the Plan and do not arise
from the community will not have any
support once the state discontinues funding for the project. Thus, projects which
are based on sound concepts could be
unsuccessful in the long term because
they are not part of the coordinated process encompassed in the state's Master
Plan.
Restrictions placed on federal funds
present another barrier to further coordination of funding. Federal funding earmarked for specific purposes results in
a categorical system of funding and fails
to recognize the inherently different
needs of individual state and local governments. It also results in limited flexibility for those entities to fund their
self-determined priorities.
The Commission made four recommendations for improving California's
coordinated efforts to fight drug and
alcohol abuse:
-The Governor and legislature should
support the efforts that go into the development and execution of the Master
Plan, and support the operations of the
Governor's Policy Council on Drug and
Alcohol Abuse and the Superintendent's
Committee on Drug, Alcohol and Tobacco Education.

-The Department of Alcohol and
Drug Programs should continue its endeavor to develop and conduct a bona
fide study evaluating the state's efforts
against drug and alcohol abuse. The
Governor and legislature should support the study.
-The Governor and legislature should
require that state funds be spent only on
drug or alcohol programs or pilot
projects that are components of the Master Plan.
-The Governor and legislature should
aggressively lobby the federal government to remove or loosen existing restrictions that are required as a part of
federal funding for reducing drug and
alcohol abuse.
Elder Care at Home (November
1991 ). On November 6, the Commission released Unsafe in Their Own
Homes: State Programs Fail to Protect
Elderly From Indignity, Abuse and Neglect, its final report in a series of studies on the elderly in California. (See
CRLR Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer I99 I)
pp. 50-51 and Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring
I 991) p. 4 7 for summaries of the
Commission's reports on residential care
facilities and skilled nursing facilities.)
According to the report, the vast array
of services intended to provide a continuum of care for the elderly are not
well-integrated and may be difficult to
access since they are scattered throughout a variety of state departments. Further, because of changes in the way the
state handles budgeting for elder care
programs, the Commission is concerned
about the prospects for maintaining or
improving senior services in the future.
The Commission focused on the effectiveness of In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS), the largest state program
involving in-home care for the elderly.
IHSS pays various types of care providers to assist those eligible elderly recipients who can no longer live independently in their homes but who do
not have complex enough problems to
require institutionalization. IHSS eligibility is determined by a county social
worker who evaluates an applicant's income. disabilities, and abilities. Following assessment, the social worker uses a
formula to compute how much assistance is needed for specific daily activities; the recipient is then authorized a
certain number of hours per month of
care.
The Commission found that IHSS
has inherent structural and funding limitations that prevent the program from
working well. Elderly people are often
subjected to poor quality of care stemming from low worker wages, lack of
training, and inadequate training of
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workers. The Commission cited the following key concerns with the IHSS
program:
-Fragmentation of responsibility.
According to the report, state government funds, sets standards for, and generally oversees the operation of IHSS;
the counties administer the program,
screening people for eligibility, providing ongoing assessments, and acting as
case managers; and the recipient is responsible for employing and supervising the care providers. This fragmentation allows the state to deny responsibility for problems that occur
when care providers are unreliable or
abusive. In turn, counties may deny responsibility because the state neither
provides sufficient funds nor requires
counties to provide adequate oversight.
-The method of managing care. Ironically, in most IHSS cases it is the recipients-individuals who have been assessed and found to need assistance to
get by with their daily living activities-who must manage the services
they receive. The recipient is expected
to recruit, interview, hire, supervise,
train, and-ifnecessary-fire the workers who provide care to them. Unfortunately, this task is beyond the capabilities of some recipients and is a drain on
energy and health for many others.
-The quality of care delivered. One
of the major concerns expressed by IHSS
recipients is that the quality of service is
poor. Workers are neither trained nor
educated to handle the needs of a geriatric population. The Commission found
that those connected with the program
believe most of the quality problems
stem from the unattractive nature of the
care provider jobs. The pay offered is
low and benefits are nonexistent, leading to low incentive and high turnover.
Individual care providers are paid $4.25
per hour. No criminal or background
checks of potential workers are required
or conducted. Finally, the quality of care
is undermined by the lack of training
programs or standards. Neither the state
nor the counties will own up to being
the "employer" of the providers for a
variety of reasons-all of which work
to the detriment of the dependent recipient. According to the Commission,
"workers need know nothing more to
become care providers than how to find
their way to the recipient's house and
how to fill out a time card."
-The differences in modes of delivering care. The two primary methods of
delivering care to IHSS recipients are
independent providers (IP) and contract
care agencies. IP service appears to be
cheaper and allows for greater personal
choice and flexibility in who provides

care. For example, the IP program allows a relative to be paid to provide
care. However, the Commission notes
that although many people provide care
for family members, statewide statistics
reflect that elder abuse is typically committed by family members rather than
outsiders. Contract care agencies recruit,
screen, train, and supervise workers, and
are usually authorized for low-hour-need
recipients who might otherwise have
difficulty finding a willing care provider. The Commission concluded that
the right of the elderly to choose who
they want as a caregiver is meaningless
if they can only find inadequate workers who are poorly screened, trained,
and supervised. According to the Commission, contract care agencies hold
greater promise for accountability and
quality control.
The Commission also found that the
state has failed to establish uniform
mechanisms that would allow it to fully
implement the goals of the California
State Plan on Aging; thus, elderly in
need of assistance are left to navigate a
fragmented system of programs run by
a diversity of state and county entities.
Finally, the Commission found that
the effect of "county realignment" remains uncertain; while it may pose risks
for the future of elder care programs, it
also presents opportunities for improvements. As part of the plan to close the
state's $14 billion budget gap in 199192, the legislature turned over certain
health and social service programs, including IHSS, to counties, along with
new sources of revenue. Because there
is no certainty that the new revenue
sources for counties will keep pace with
program costs, counties in the future
may suspend IHSS services for some
recipients. On the positive side, the legislative realignment package directed
that new approaches to long-term care
for the elderly be studied.
The Commission's report concluded
that the state should take immediate action to improve the IHSS program, move
more aggressively to integrate the array
of services offered to the elderly, and
monitor closely the effects of realignment. The Commission offered the following recommendations:
-The Governor and legislature should
enact legislation to require each county
to adopt one of several approaches that
will provide accountability, worker
training, and reliability in the IP mode
of care.
-The Governor and legislature should
enact legislation to encourage counties
to place new non-severely impaired,
low-hour cases into the contract care
mode of service.
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-The Governor and legislature should
enact legislation to institute other IHSS
improvements and set standards that will
al low the program to work more
smoothly and responsively.
-The Secretary of the Health and
Welfare Agency should move aggressively across departmental lines to
implement the integration of services
outlined in the California State Plan on
Aging and, in the process, maximize
federal funding of programs.
-The Governor and the legislature
should closely monitor the effect of
county realignment on IHSS and other
programs that protect the frail elderly.
Conflict of Interest Code Amendments. At this writing, the Commission's
proposed amendments to its conflict of
interest code in Division 8, Title2ofthe
California Code of Regulations, await
review and approval by the Fair Political Practices Commission. (See CRLR
Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1991) p. 50 for
background information.)
Recent Hearing. On October 17, the
Commission held its second public hearing on California's transportation system and needs. The Commission hoped
to release a report in January.
DEPARTMENT OF
CONSUMER AFFAIRS
Director: Jim Conran
(916) 445-4465
Consumer lnfoline: (800) 344-9940
lnfoline for the Speech/Hearing
Impaired: (916) 322-1700
In addition to its functions relating
to its 38 boards, bureaus, and commissions, the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) is charged with carrying
out the Consumer Affairs Act of 1970.
The Department educates consumers,
assists them in complaint mediation, advocates their interests before the legislature, and represents them before the
state's administrative agencies and
courts.
The Department may intervene in
matters regarding its boards if probable
cause exists to believe that the conduct
or activity of a board, its members, or
employees constitutes a violation of
criminal law.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
DCA Administration Takes HandsOn Approach. Starting at the top with
Director Jim Conran, the new DCA administration is actively and visibly participating in the business of the
Department's constituent boards and
bureaus. In a sharp departure from previous administrations, top DCA staff33

